The Canadian Electricity Association’s Geoff Smith focussed in the energy sector, saying, “While these projects are exciting and innovative, the fact that many maintain their spot on the list year after year reinforces the principal challenge faced by Canada’s electricity sector–that needed infrastructure projects are often subject to unnecessary regulatory delays. Our preference would be for [more of] these projects to graduate from the Top 100 and move to the completed list.”

Doug Salloum with the Canadian Society for Civil Engineering was more concerned about longevity than the speed in which projects can be delivered. No matter what the sector, Salloum says one question should always be asked: will the infrastructure asset last long enough to be of value to Canadians? According to Salloum, “If an infrastructure project fails within 50 or 60 years of completion, it’s either because it wasn’t built right or else because it wasn’t the right thing to build.” Salloum supports the environmental benefits of low-carbon hydroelectricity projects and public transit. However, he cautioned that expanding energy capacity encourages increased electrical demand, a scenario that could end up relegating energy efficiency to the backseat.

“With regards to building the right thing, it’s all about public consultation,” continued Salloum. “And that consultation needs to start at the conceptual phase, not after a government has already decided that new infrastructure is needed.”

Salloum’s example of a project that broke this rule? The Turcot Interchange project, our number seven. “This project famously missed the boat,” he said. “Consultation didn’t allow for public input on the fundamental concepts of the future interchange. As a result, the interchange is being designed to accommodate more, rather than fewer, single person vehicles.”

Elisabeth Arnold, principal at Sustainable Community Development, made a similar comment about the Turcot project. “The Turcot Interchange is not a sustainable solution,” she said. “The responses to the bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement, City of Montreal, and the recommendations of citizens have missed some key opportunities to improve the modal split by failing to include meaningful transit and cycling infrastructure in the project despite the additional $1.5 billion cost of the project.”

Arnold took a triple-bottom-line approach to her evaluation of the top 10 projects, weighing environmental, social, and economic impact. While the Turcot rated at the lowest end of the scale, Arnold ranked Toronto’s two transit initiatives at the highest end. Both the Spadina subway extension and the Eglinton-Scarborough Crosstown light-rail transit (LRT) project received the highest rating across all indicators because “they provide an alternative to single occupancy automobile use, with the corresponding environmental, social, and economic benefits [going] to individual commuters and residents of the City of Toronto as a whole.”

Canada West Foundation’s Casey Vander Ploeg decide that the top 10 projects were, in fact, not the best 10. He chose from the entire list to create his own top 10 based on how unique and innovative they are. Highlights from his list include the York VIVA Bus Rapidway for its design concept, Swan Hills ISCG Power Project for finance, technology, and concept, and the Niagara Tunnel Project for technological innovation.

According to Vander Ploeg, the VIVA project scored highly on his personal favorites list because the concept is innovative. “It helps public transit to better compete with the private automobiles on the ‘free’ road,” he said. “The dedicated bus lanes ensure a time advantage during congestion, and that makes public transit a more attractive option.” This project highlights an innovative way that communities are building cost effective infrastructure now, with an eye toward long-term planning.

The VIVA Rapidways are being designed to accommodate Light Rail Vehicles if they eventually replace the current bus system. By building the initial infrastructure as a system of dedicated lanes, the region can avoid having to completely reorganize its public transit system in the future.

Vander Ploeg chose the Swan Hills project in part because of the unique technology being deployed at the site. Instead of mining the coal, the project injects non-potable water and carbon dioxide into the ground, gasifying the coal. This gas is piped up through a well, refined, burned and turned into energy through a turbine, and then the emissions are captured via a carbon capture and storage facility. The captured emissions are being sold to an oil sands project for enhanced oil recovery, further reducing the quantity of fresh water required for oil extraction.   

While each of these industry professionals has taken a different method when reviewing their Top 10 projects, what is interesting are the common trends. These included a focus on projects that are sustainable, innovative, and work towards providing Canadians with reliable, cost-effective infrastructure assets.

I attended the event, on behalf of ReNew Canada, and was on hand to see a number of presentations related to the FIT review and specific technologies. The first day of the event was focused on examining the potential impacts of the review on the viability of the renewable energy industry in Ontario. Jan Carr, Strategic Adviser, Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP, and former president of the Ontario Power Authority, delivered the keynote speech. Carr discussed how the renewable energy strategy in Ontario was developed and the impact that the current renewable energy framework is having on investment decision making.

Carr highlighted several key indicators that investors look for when considering whether to back a renewable energy project. Carr used the example of wind energy to highlight some of the issues he has found to be particularly salient. According to Carr’s presentation, the top three positive attributes that investors see in Ontario include: Length of the Power Purchase Agreements (PPA), the transparency of the PPA process, and the availability of construction and engineering expertise. Carr also highlighted what he perceived to be the most widely held concerns of investor, including: The ease at which companies can obtain municipal permits, stability of the political environment, and the level of coordination between government related bodies.

The remainder of the day consisted of a number of panels that examined issues such as FIT project connection, financing FIT projects, FIT contract management, and the project approvals process. While each of these panels had a number of specific questions that they examined, one reoccurring issue was highlighted. Throughout all of the discussions, the excess bureaucracy of the FIT program was highlighted as one of the most challenging obstacles to overcome when developing a project. Some participants noted that retaining investors and convincing banks to provide debt or equity to your project becomes increasingly difficult the longer the project languishes in the approvals process.

Leading up to the vote had been considerable politicking by both Toronto mayor Rob Ford and his executive team. Principally, Ford’s argument for subways had three dominant themes. The first was that subways carry more people than LRT’s and do not impede the flow of traffic. The second reason he stated was that people do not like streetcars.

The mayor repeatedly compared subways to the current fleet of streetcars that are operated on Toronto’s roads.  He did not mention any of the substantial differences between light rail technology and streetcars, which include dedicated rights-of-way, higher speeds, greater passenger capacity, and fewer stops. The final argument that Ford made in promoting his subway line was initially that the private sector would pay for it through a public private partnership.

However, that argument had significant opposition from many councillors because he would not provide a detailed plan for raising the necessary revenue to fund the P3. Ford and his executive team had advocated building the subway stops and leveraging the construction to develop a public private partnership to build out the remainder of the subway line. He stated that if “you put a shovel in the ground, investors will come, funding will come, it’s all going to come.” Of course, a P3 does not mean that the private sector will hand out the funds necessary for construction; they require the government to demonstrate the ability to pay for the construction over the length of the contract, generally 30 years.

Several councillors, such as Josh Matlow and Karen Stintz, had initially been willing to work with the mayor to build his subway line. But, they turned their support to the LRT plan when the mayor refused to agree to any new taxes or fees to raise the necessary revenues. Because the LRT line was fully funded and planned, they began advocating for the LRT line.

Even Ford’s staunchest supporters became disappointed with the unwillingness of the mayor to compromise on finding a new tool to raise revenue. Councillor and city budget chief Mike Del Grande introduced a motion to introduce a parking levy that would be dedicated exclusively to funding transit; he suggested that the levy could raise $100 million per year.

However, Ford refused to support the motion and did not discuss it or display any willingness to introduce new revenue tools to fund his subway plan. While many councillors appear to have been willing to introduce a new tax or fee to pay for the Sheppard subway, without a mayor that was willing to compromise or work with council, the majority of councillors voted to build an LRT that already has full funding and the necessary regulatory approvals in place.

The panel included David Crombie Chair, Toronto Lands Corporation; Professor Eric Miller Director, Cities Centre, University of Toronto; Dr. Gordon Chong CEO, Toronto Transit Infrastructure Ltd.; Mitzie Hunter CEO, Greater Toronto CivicAction Alliance; Prabha Khosla Chair, Toronto Women’s City Alliance; Israt Ahmed Community Planner – Scarborough, Toronto Social Planning; and Ernie McCullough Executive Director, Sheppard East Village BIA. With the exception of Gordon Chong, the panel was unanimous in its support for the development of a LRT system.

Not surprisingly, Gordon Chong, a supporter of Toronto Mayor Rob Ford, disagreed with the conclusions of the report. Separately, Chong had a report commissioned and drafted that proposed that subways are the best choice. A number of news organisations have reported that Chong became upset when the panel would not include his report in its entirety in the appendix of the panel’s report. Instead, the panel included a hyperlink to Chong’s report, which is consistent with how all of the other reports used in the development of their recommendation were referenced.

Mayor Rob Ford has pre-emptively rejected the recommendation of the panel because he stated that all of the panel members are “biased” towards subways. The report will be used by city councillors to inform them of the options available to the city, prior to a vote on March 21^st that will determine whether the city moves ahead with a subway or LRT on Sheppard Ave.

Among the most contentious of his recommendation is the proposal to increase the price paid for energy through the provinces time-of-use program. Under his recommendation, the price paid for energy during peak demand hours should be raised to more accurately reflect the cost of wholesale electricity. Coupled with the recommendation to remove the Ontario Clean Energy Benefit, which removes 10 per cent from the energy bill of Ontarian households, Drummond’s advice appears to promote higher energy costs.

Of course, this is not the first time this has been recommended. Increasing the price for energy is constantly promoted as one of the only sure-fire methods of increasing conservation amongst users. Conservation means fewer new megawatts are required to be added onto the grid, which can reduce both the administrative cost and generation cost of energy.

However, the most interesting, and basic, recommendation from the Drummond report is probably how strongly education is stressed as a major factor for reducing energy demand, and therefore cost and strain on the system. It is unfortunately true that many people do not understand the basics of the energy system in Ontario. Canadians in general use more energy per capita than almost any other country on the planet. Yet, very few understand how difficult it is to generate, transmit, and maintain the energy system. Drummond recommends that the government undertake an extensive education campaign to teach people how their energy is generated, the costs of various forms of energy, the roles of each organisation in the system, and the role that individuals will play in the emerging smart grid system.

Drummond highlighted the fact that “average capital investment chronically lags what is actually needed by $1.5 billion per year. In these two sectors, where the equivalent of about half of the $72 billion in municipally owned assets used to deliver these services needs renewal over the period from 2005 to 2019, a funding gap of that magnitude poses serious fiscal risks.” He further highlighted Alternative Financing and Procurement tools as an option for renewing infrastructure at a sustainable and fiscally reasonable manner.

In addition to recommending a full cost recovery model for the maintenance and development of water infrastructure, Drummond also made a number of water related recommendations on the use and monitoring of water resources. Specifically, the cost of water management to the ministries of Natural Resources and the Environment was mentioned, with the recommendation to develop a payment system where the burden of cost falls on the “beneficiary’s shoulders” and not on the public’s.

Three tiers of usage are discussed in the report including high, medium and low volume users. High volume users include industries such as cement and beverage manufacturers along with canning/pickling facilities. Medium volume users consist of industries such as mining, construction, wood production and recreational facilities. Low volume users include electricity generators such as hydroelectric and nuclear facilities. According to Drummond the Ontario government spends approximately $15 million a year through various ministries to manage water quantity and encourage efficient use but recovers only a fraction of that through the issuance of permits.

Importantly, Drummond highlights the fact that congestion and a lack of public transit options are contributing to economic inefficiencies that currently cost an estimated $6 billion a year and are predicted to cost $15 billion annually by 2031. While he acknowledges that Metrolinx has a long term transit plan, known as The Big Move, Drummond cites the $50 billion cost of the project as problematic because only $11.5 billion has been committed. Further, Drummond correctly notes that because his mandate explicitly excludes the ability to consider tax increases, finding new funding alternatives will be difficult. His recommendation: “review the roles and operations of public and private mass transit service providers in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area…to find efficiencies in those regions’ transportation networks. Act on that evidence to improve the efficiency of those services.”

As well, Drummond notes that because the responsibility for public transit delivery remains with municipalities, efficiency is reduced due to administrative and procedural overlaps. While Drummond has no recommendations for raising substantial funds, he does suggest opportunities for creating some new revenue streams. GO Transit parking lots were highlighted as being a significant cost to the province because the company does not currently charge for parking in any of its lots, despite the provincial and federal governments having recently invested $500 million to increase the number of spaces at GO stations.

His next recommendation is one that many people have highlighted as being a colossal gap in Canada: the lack of a national transit strategy. As Drummond, and dozens of other people, point out, Canada is the only Organisation for Cooperation and Economic Development member country without a national transit strategy and he recommends getting started on that immediately. To further raise revenue and improve economic performance, he promotes using a mix of tools such as High Occupancy Vehicle lanes, local gas-taxes and parking surcharges. Ultimately, Drummond makes it clear that “without clear input from citizens, striking the right balance of these measures will be near impossible.”

At $195 million, the Vancouver City Centre Transmission Project wasn’t big enough to make this year’s Top 100. The project, which includes a new Vancouver substation and new underground transmission line, is the largest investment that BC Hydro has made in Vancouver in 30 years. It’s an investment equal to the $190 million being spent on the new Winnipeg Stadium, which was also too small to make this year’s list.

Is BC Hydro’s investment more important for Vancouver than this sporting complex is for Winnipeg?

Winnipeg’s stadium is moving forward, but other social infrastructure projects haven’t been so lucky. The Royal Alberta Museum was removed from this year’s Top 100 after funding fell through; Quebec City is having trouble sealing the deal on a new hockey arena. Museums, sports complexes, and parks are often seen as extras, investments that should not be made if basic public works assets still need attention.

But some would argue that creating a world-class city means investing in those amenities. Without those spaces to attract what author and academic Richard Florida calls the “creative class,” to drive tourism and draw event promoters, a city’s economy suffers. It can also be an opportunity to create iconic buildings that help brand a city, or attract global interest.

Unfortunately, it’s hard to monetize a strong brand. And not every arena or arts venue will benefit a city. There have been many sport and entertainment complexes proposed and built that some have argued were not worth the investment of the public’s tax dollars.

In February 2011, when federal Finance Minister Jim Flaherty publicly floated the possibility of using the federal gas tax to fund a hockey arena in Quebec City, the Canadian Taxpayers Federation, who lobbied for years to have part of the federal gas tax dedicated to road repair and maintenance, came out against it, saying it could lead to more wasteful spending on future sports arenas. Quebec City’s planned $400-million hockey arena (for a team that doesn’t play in the city anymore) could have made this year’s Top 100, but with plans to move ahead still unclear and funding not entirely secured, it’s being held over until next year. The project’s final budget should be known in spring 2012. Some argue this type of spending in irresponsible in a province where transportation infrastructure desperately needs upgrading and replacement. At the time, Tasha Kheiriddin wrote in the National Post, “It is unjustifiable to spend public money on a pro sports arena.” She cited a study conducted by two U.S. professors showing these types of investments do not, in fact, yield the returns they claim. “Worse yet,” she wrote, “they risk turning into boondoggles like the Toronto Skydome, which cost taxpayers over $400 million before being sold to Rogers Communications for a scant $25 million.”

Another potential boondoggle: sports venues built for big, one-time events that then become money pits. Ontario is hoping the infrastructure it has chosen to build to accommodate the 2015 Pan Am Games will avoid that pitfall, serving the region long after the Games have ended. The Athletes’ Village (worth $1 billion, but it’s an entire development, not a single project, so it didn’t rank on the Top 100) is only speeding up work that Waterfront Toronto was planning already—that’s according to Infrastructure Ontario.

One Pan Am project in question was Hamilton’s stadium. The Ontario provincial government rescued the $152.1-million Ivor Wynne Stadium rebuild project in January 2011 by offering an extra $22.5 million to fill a funding gap. The province had already promised to contribute about $35 million to the project.

The opportunity to host the Pan Am Games was seen as a major win for Ontario. The boost to the province’s economy is expected to be substantial. However, major investments in projects like these with no promise of such a significant economic gain are always going to be a hard sell.   

This year’s list has the biggest-ever total: $114.2 billion in infrastructure projects. This isn’t all new investment—it includes 71 projects that were on last year’s Top 100. A project remains on this list until it is completed, which means some will continue to rank for a few years, maybe even a decade.

Even so, the 29 new projects added to the list this year represent an additional $30 billion in infrastructure investment in Canada. To put that into perspective, the federal government’s Building Canada plan to help fund infrastructure will invest 
$33 billion over six years.

The sectors in which that new $30 billion is being spent—and the types of projects within those sectors—may provide insight into current and future industry trends.

P3s and high security

New to the list this year, the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) is responsible for the collection of electronic intelligence to support the defence and foreign policy of the Canadian government, as well as the protection of electronic information and communication.

The project highlights a trend already prevalent in Ontario: the use of public-private partnerships (P3s) to fund high-security projects. In Ontario, every new courthouse is being constructed through a P3 model, usually a design-build-finance-maintain contract. Five of these justice P3s are currently featured on the Top 100. Together, the projects represent $1.8 billion in federal infrastructure spending. In Ontario, secure facilities have a total contract value of $1.6 billion.

The new facility for CSEC (number 35 on the Top 100), a federal project, is being developed using a P3 model, as is the new RCMP E Division Headquarters project (number 32). The new facility will act as the hub for the collection of electronic intelligence by the Canadian government. As such, building security is paramount for ensuring the CSEC can successfully fulfill its role. The use of private contractors for running many of the facilities operations after construction marks the first time that operations and maintenance work will be handled by a private company within a high-security federal facility. The use of private contractors for this project has prompted some CSEC personnel to voice their concerns publicly.

Concerns have mostly been around allowing staff from private companies into high-security sections of the facility. CSEC employees worry that allowing employees from private companies into secure rooms represents a security risk because these people will not have taken the same oaths as CSEC’s full members.

Bidding wars

The replacement of the Montreal subway’s rolling stock, number 11 on this year’s list, has seen its share of problems associated with the procurement process, including an international scandal, the introduction of specific legislation, and a letter from a foreign head of state. The issue began when the Government of Quebec decided that the City of Montreal and the Province did not have to tender this project internationally. This was based on a belief that because Bombardier, who now holds the contract with partner Alstom, are the unique supplier of these types of rail cars in Canada, they are exempt from the requirement to use a bidding process.

While this may be true, it appears that Spain’s Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles and China’s ZhuZhou Locamotive had both expressed interest in bidding on the project. They have repeatedly stated that $2.6 million per car is extraordinarily high—an argument supported by the fact that Bombardier reportedly built subway cars for Chicago’s subway system at $1.5 million per car and has given no justification for the difference in price. Spain’s Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero even wrote a letter to Quebec Premier Jean Charest expressing his displeasure.

The deal has resulted in a new law in Quebec’s National Assembly awarding the contract to the consortium, but there is still the threat of a legal challenge from the two foreign companies seeking access. An interesting aspect of this contract has been the shift in perspective on the part of the Charest government. In the past, Charest has been a proponent for developing new trade agreements to facilitate this type of contract, but now seems to be taking a more protectionist stance in his own province. Despite ZhuZhou’s purchase of industrial land and commitment to building the cars in Canada for almost $1 million less per unit, the Charest government remained committed to purchasing from Bombardier. Whether this decision will result in future problems for Bombardier internationally has yet to be seen.

This issue highlights an important question: how can governments create transparent, independent, and effective bidding processes for large projects? While the process for procuring the subway cars for this project has been seen by many observers as a fumbled approach not to be repeated, other governments, notably the Government of Canada, have recently made transparency a cornerstone of the procurement process.

Recently, the federal government announced the winners of two shipbuilding contracts worth more than $30 billion. The process the government used to facilitate the bidding process drew as much attention as the announcement itself. With three main shipyards (in British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Quebec) bidding on the contracts, regional politics was set to be a staple of the contracting process.

Hoping to avoid any perception of political interference, the Harper government charged several high-level bureaucrats, along with consulting firm KPMG, with establishing a system free of federal and regional political interference. It involved retaining tight control over the bids submitted and the evaluation system for determining the winners, Nova Scotia and British Columbia, and the loser, Quebec. In structuring the process, the government ensured that ministers would not be allowed to lobby for one bid over another. Moreover, within the system itself, only a very small group of individuals knew which bids were submitted by the three shipyards. During the review process of the bids, most bureaucrats and consultants were unaware of which bid they were reviewing because the bid papers were titled with numbers and not the name of the company involved. This extra step in the process made it easier for the bureaucrats in charge of the process to focus on the merits of the bids without being distracted by political stakeholders.

Pulling rank

The Eglinton Crosstown Light Rail Transit (LRT) Project, once number four on the Top 100, was bumped to number one after an administration change for the City of Toronto led to the cancelation of the Transit City plan. Initially the project was going to cost $4.6 billion. Now, it will cost $8.2 billion, a difference of $3.6 billion (or $360 million per each additional 10 buried kilometres of track). This decision had the added effect of cancelling the other three planned light rail lines under Transit City, which allowed the province to reallocate the funds for these lines to the Eglinton project.

Regional transit authority Metrolinx originally bought four tunnel boring machines (TBMs) for this project, but may need another two to four now that an additional 10 km will be tunnelled. Spacing columnist John Lorinc calls the decision to bury the entire Eglinton line “the single most expensive infrastructure mistake in Toronto history.”

A less obvious consequence of this change is its effect on the engineering associated with a project of this scale. Burying the Eglinton line has one major hurdle to cross before it will be completed: how will the LRT cross the Don Valley? Prior to the change, the Transit City plan had the Eglinton line emerging from a tunnel in the east end of Toronto and continuing on a dedicated right-of-way along Eglinton Avenue and over the Don Valley. But now that all new transit must be tunnelled, the TTC and Metrolinx are confronted with a complex, and potentially very expensive, engineering challenge. Essentially, without a right-of-way there are two options available for this project: bridge or tunnel.

Tunnelling under the Don Valley presents a challenge because of the grade associated with the Valley’s geography, while a bridge could be a potentially very expensive option depending on the outcome of an EA.

More tunnelling also means more soil to dispose of—potentially unsellable soil if it has been contaminated. ReNew Canada met with chief project manager, the Toronto Transit Commission’s (TTC’s) Peter Allibone, and Jack Collins, VP of rapid transit implementation for Metrolinx, at the corner of Black Creek and Eglinton where contractors are already on site, working on the tunnel’s first launch shaft. Collins said the soil at those depths should be clean, and said it’s actually quite easy to find a buyer for excess soil on these types of projects. In fact, they have already sold a portion to the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority for a special project.

While both Allibone and Collins said the original EAs completed for the bulk of the project will remain valid—new EAs will only be done for the additional sections—it’s clear that changes to a project that diverge from a long-term plan create a host of challenges, some of them unforeseen.

Toronto’s decision to change a project that was part of a larger plan for the city raises a complex issue: what effect can local politics have on project development, engineering, and cost? Due to the nature of the Top 100 list (projects remain on the list until they are completed), over the years, other long-term projects have moved up in the ranking due to changes in scope or cost overruns. Still more projects have been removed from the list because funding fell through due, at times, to a change in political administration.

Carbon capture

The Boundary Dam Integrated Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) Demonstration Project will refurbish Unit 3 at the Boundary Dam coal power station. This will be the world’s largest project to use CCS for enhanced oil recovery, with the potential to capture an estimated one million tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO₂) annually.

The largest source of CO₂ in Alberta comes from burning coal for energy generation. Sitting on about 1,000 years worth of cheap energy, Alberta has a pressing desire to develop its coal resources without significantly increasing the resulting CO₂ emissions.

CCS projects are becoming increasingly popular in the prairie provinces. The Top 100 list for 2011 included one CCS pilot—Alberta’s Project Pioneer, the first-ever CCS project to make it onto the Top 100. This year, two more projects made the list.

An abundance of oil in the west, but criticism of the resulting environmental damage, has prompted this surge in investments in the developing technology.

The federal government allocated funding to CCS in its 2008 budget, Alberta has created a $2 billion fund for CCS projects, and SaskPower is investing $1 billion in Boundary Bay (the project cost in total is $1.24 billion, putting it at number 28 on the Top 100).

Saskatchewan sits on about 300 years’ worth of coal reserves. That, along with the low cost of energy produced by coal, is pushing the Province to find new ways to develop this resource without the resulting environmental impact. Adding to their challenge, the federal government recently introduced new regulations surrounding coal power plants. The new regulations mandate that any new facility completed after 2015 must have emissions comparable to a high-efficiency natural gas plant. To meet these regulations, Alberta and Saskatchewan are focusing on developing cost-effective CCS systems.

Money from Alberta’s CCS Fund ($285 million) is being invested in the Swan Hills In-Situ Coal Gasification project (number 19 on this year’s list). The project turns underground coal into gas. Emissions from the project will be captured and piped to nearby oil projects for use in enhanced oil recovery operations.

CCS technology currently remains economically unfeasible, which is why government funding is necessary to move these types of projects forward. Aside from the benefit of sequestering more carbon, projects of this nature are incredibly important for building up the engineering, research, and experience levels of Canadian companies.

The winds of change

At a cost of between $750 million and $900 million, the K2 Wind Project is the first of its kind to break into the top 40. Wind projects of this scale are becoming increasingly common (see “Wind Development in the Top 100”, page 18).

Across Canada, individual provinces are pursuing renewable energy through different mechanisms. Ontario is using a Feed-in Tariff program to encourage the development of renewable energy sources, such as wind. In Alberta, where the energy market is unregulated, wind companies are using innovative methods to ensure their projects are economically viable. Greengate Power Corporation is bringing additional revenue for its project, Blackspring Ridge I (number 55 on the Top 100), by providing renewable energy credits to a California-based utility, Pacific Gas & Electric.

Many new wind projects grace this year’s Top 100 list, and even more such as the 366-megawatt Seigneurie de Beaupre Wind Farm in Quebec, are expected to be on next year’s list.

Nuclear: beyond generation

The Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) may have only narrowly made the list this year (at $260 million, it’s number 97 on the Top 100) but it is no less significant. The first project of its kind to appear in this report, it is dedicated to the clean-up and long-term management of historic low-level radioactive waste in the Ontario municipalities of Port Hope and Clarington. The project is a joint effort led by Natural Resources Canada in partnership with Atomic Energy of Canada and Public Works and Government Services Canada.

Low-level radioactive waste in Canada is an ongoing, expensive issue. Canada has a long history of mining and refining radioactive minerals. But, similar to the history of most mining industries in Canada, safety and environmental monitoring practices have changed substantially over the decades. The Port Hope and Port Granby projects reflect the increased awareness of the public risks from a long history of refining radioactive products in the area.

The Port Hope area has been managing low-level radioactive waste since radium was first refined in the area in 1932, followed by uranium refinement in the 1940s and 1950s. Removing contaminated waste from the area began in the mid-1970s with the transfer of over 100,000 tonnes of contaminated soil from Port Hope to Chalk River Laboratories. It wasn’t until the federal government established the Low Level Radioactive Waste Management Office (LLRWMO) in 1982 that a national long-term clean-up plan was put into motion.

As part of that plan, the LLRWMO tried to find a community willing to host a waste management facility. When that didn’t happen, the Township of Hope agreed to store the waste locally and the PHAI was born. There are two distinct projects under the initiative: the Port Hope Project and Port Granby Project. Long-term waste storage facilities will be built at each location and will be designed to contain the waste for hundreds of years. To hold the waste, a mound consisting of more than twenty above- and below-ground layers will be constructed, with the contaminated soil housed in the centre of the mound.

In nuclear energy generation, facility owners typically deal with radioactive waste, paying to store it on site, or at another facility’s site. In this situation, the company responsible for refining the mined uranium from the 1930s to 1970s, Eldorado, is no longer in operation. “You can’t get blood from a stone,” says Mark Giles with the PHAI. “Those responsible for waste are normally held accountable for cleaning it up, unless that company no longer exists. The Government of Canada took on the responsibility—it was, after all, a crown corporation.” The company was originally privately owned, but the federal government purchased it in the 1970s.

Projects to manage low-level radioactive waste have been conducted since the 1980s in locations across Canada, mostly in the west and northwest. But this is the largest such operation ever to be undertaken.

Record investment

These are just a few of the trends and notable projects based on almost a year of research and interviews on the part of a team dedicated to Canada’s infrastructure industry. A more thorough breakdown, by sector and sub-sector, including details on funding sources, can be found in this year’s Top 100 report, which was circulated with this issue.